Abstract-In modern wireless networks autonomous agents may exhibit selfish or malicious behavior which can compromise the performance of the network. For this reason, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been proposed to monitor the agents' behavior, along with the deployment of Trust/reputation Management Systems (TMS) to enforce cooperation among the agents. IDS may not continuously monitor agents' behavior to avoid excessive deployment costs. In this work we consider agents that exhibit both selfish and malicious behavior and study their pairwise interactions when they participate in a packetforwarding task, in the scenario of partial monitoring of their actions by the IDS. We investigate the decision-making process of the agents and derive conditions that if satisfied, the trust-based strategy proposed by the TMS constitutes an optimal strategy for the agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
In modern wireless networks, autonomous agents, that do not necessarily belong to the same authority, interact to pursue individual goals. In order for these networks to work efficiently, agents must cooperate and forward packets to intended destinations. However, it is unrealistic to take for granted that agents will always cooperate in an altruistic fashion. The main types of "misbehavior" are selfish and malicious behavior. Selfish agents are interested in receiving cooperation benefits from others while contributing as little as possible to the forwarding task to reduce transmission cost. In contrast, malicious agents aim at harming other agents by launching various kinds of attacks such as packet/content modification, Byzantine and Sybil attacks, amongst others.
Game Theory (GT) has been widely utilized for studying interactions among autonomous self-interested agents participating in a packet-forwarding task in wireless networks [1] , [2] , [5] . It is shown in [5] that network-wide cooperation among autonomous self-interested is unlikely to occur without providing incentives. For this reason, trust/reputation models [1] - [4] have been proposed to stimulate cooperation. In [4] the watchdog mechanism monitors the agents' misbehavior, while the pathrater mechanism selects routes consisting of trustworthy nodes. In [2] , [3] reputation systems based on the indirect reciprocity principle are designed.
A Trust Management System (TMS) categorizes agents into trustworthy and untrustworthy based on their behavior. Apart from updating agents' trust values, an effective TMS aims at enforcing a desired behavior pattern. This behavior helps the trustworthy agents and ignores the untrustworthy ones.
Agents' actions are usually assumed to be observable. An exception is [1] which considers interactions among selfish agents and an agent's packet forwarding action may be perceived by another agent as packet drop due to not overhearing the transmission. The monitoring mechanisms deployed for detecting agents' actions and especially misbehavior patterns are called Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The most commonly used IDS technique is overhearing an agent's transmissions [1] , [4] , [8] . However, low energy budget networks, such as WSNs, may employ partial monitoring IDS schemes that periodically sample the agents' packets to decide on their behavior as discussed in [9] .
In this paper, we consider agents that can act both selfishly by not forwarding others' packets and maliciously by launching packet modification attacks, a subject less considered in the literature. We assume that an IDS performs overhearing periodically and then based on the IDS action detection outcome, the TMS updates the agents' trust values. We then study the impact of the sampling probability of the IDS along with the properties of the TMS on the decision-making process of the agents. We highlight the implications in the analysis caused by considering malicious behavior and study the effectiveness and limitations of trust-based strategies when the agents condition their actions on the publicly observed trust values. Finally, we derive conditions that if satisfied an agent is incentivized to follow a desired strategy which is beneficial for the network, despite its myopic temptation to misbehave. In doing so, we formulate the agents interactions as a Stochastic Game (SG) and the solution concept of Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE) is utilized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the system model and the trust update mechanism. The decision making process is analyzed in Section III. The results are discussed in Section IV while conclusions are given in section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. Agents' interactions and modeling
We study the interactions of two agents i, j which want to forward their packets to their intended destinations
is outside the transmission range of i (resp. j). Thus, there is need for i (resp. j) to forward the packets of j (resp. i) to d j (resp. d i ). Both agents may exhibit selfish or malicious behavior. The set of admissible transmission decisions (i.e. actions) for an agent is
The values −1, 0, 1 correspond to malicious, selfish and honest action, meaning the agent chooses to launch an attack (i.e. modify the packets and then forward them), not to forward the packets and forward them to the destination, respectively. The actions of the agents can be observed by overhearing agents' transmissions, which is possible due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions [4] , [8] . In this work we assume that an IDS periodically performs the overhearing process and then the TMS updates the trust values of the agents and disseminates the new ones to them.
We assume a slotted time structure. At every time slot t the IDS monitors the agents' actions with a sampling probability P a . We use I d = 1 to denote that the IDS performs sampling, while I d = 0 denotes that IDS is idle during current time slot. The interactions of two transmitting agents i, j during a time slot t are summarized as follows: 1. TMS informs agents about their trust values s i , s j . 2. If IDS performs sampling (i.e. I d = 1)
• The agents (i, j) exchange the packets to be forwarded to the corresponding destinations.
• IDS overhears the original packets.
• Agents select their actions a i , a j .
• IDS overhears the transmitted packets if any (i.e. a i , a j = 0), then compares them with the original packets to check for content modifications. If it detects a i = −1 (resp. • Agents exchange their packets to be forwarded to the corresponding destinations.
• Agents select their actions (a i , a j ).
• Receivers d i , d j use the packets received. Note that agents i, j do not know at the beginning of the time slot if the IDS will perform sampling but they know the value of the sampling probability P a . Moreover, due to the existence of malicious agents a distributed IDS cannot rely on exchange of detected actions as in the selfish agents case [1] . Moreover, the source can not directly notify its intended destination to disregard modified packets. For these reasons, a centralized IDS/TMS is employed in this study.
B. Instantaneous Reward
Each agent wants its packets to reach the desired destination. This interest is captured by a forwarding benefit f > 0 if the other agent forwards its packets (i.e. a = 1). Forwarding the other agent's packets incurs a transmission cost c > 0. Finally, if an agent launches an undetected attack (i.e. the IDS does not perform sampling), then an illegal gain e > 0 would be acquired expressing the gain of a successful attack. In this case, the other agent would suffer a loss > 0 from the attack. Agent i does not know whether the IDS will be active in the current time slot, so it uses the sampling probability P a to form the instantaneous expected reward
where
and R r i are the expected rewards resulting from the transmission actions of agents i and j. R j is defined accordingly. Remark 1. We note that in the case of multi-hop communications when agent i wants to send packets to a destination d i that is more than two hops away, then all the agents which lie in the path from i to d i are needed to forward the packets of i and thus the reward for agent i would depend on the actions of all the agents on that path.
C. Trust
TMS categorizes the agents into trustworthy and untrustworthy. Thus, S = {0, 1} is the trust value set and a trust value s i = 0 (resp. s i = 1) means that the agent i is considered as untrustworthy (resp. trustworthy). Apart from disseminating and updating the agents' trust values, an effective TMS would ideally like to enforce a desired behavior to the agents. This desired behavior, henceforth called as honest policy and denoted as π H , promotes helping the trustworthy agents (i.e. a i = 1 if s j = 1) and ignoring the untrustworthy ones (i.e.
In this paper we focus on Markovian TMS where the updated trust values s i , s j depend on the current trust values s i , s j , on the actions a i , a j and on whether the IDS performed sampling during the current time slot. If the IDS does not perform sampling (i.e. I d = 0), the trust values remain unchanged
otherwise the trust values are updated based on the following principle. The TMS rewards the agents if they follow the desired honest policy π H and punishes them if they do not. If both agents are trustworthy (i.e. (s i , s j ) = (1, 1)) and i follows π H (i.e. a i = π H (1, 1) = 1), then i remains as trustworthy (i.e. s i = 1). If i does not cooperate (a i = 0) or modifies the packets (a i = −1), then it is punished (i.e. transits to s i = 0) with a punishment rate q and 1, respectively (modifying packets is more harmful than not forwarding packets). If agent i is trustworthy and j untrustworthy (i.e. (s i , s j ) = (1, 0)), and i selects a i = π H (1, 0) = 0, then it remains at s i = 1, while if i helps the untrustworthy j (a i = 1) or attacks (a i = −1), then i is punished and transits to s i = 0 with probability 1. If both agents are untrustworthy (i.e. (s i , s j ) = (0, 0)) and a i = π H (0, 0) = 0, then i could be forgiven and transit to s i = 1 with a redemption probability φ,
For the combinations of a i , s i , s j not defined in (7)- (11), it is
III. OPTIMAL ACTION SELECTION
In the static case where agents interact only once, an agent wants to maximize its instantaneous expected reward (2) . From (2)-(4) it can be seen that choosing to forward the other agent's packets (a i = 1) is dominated by either not forwarding (a i = 0) or by attacking (a i = −1), regardless of a j . In particular, if (1 − P a )e > c (resp. if (1 − P a )e < c) then a = −1 (resp. a i = 0) is the optimal myopic choice. If agents interact repeatedly for an infinite (or unknown) time interval, then an agent's goal is to maximize the sum of discounted expected long-term rewards
where the expectation is over other agent's actions and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor which expresses the foresightedness of the agent. Agent i decides on its strategy using the available information up to time t (history). A (pure) strategy π i is a sequence of maps π s j (0) , . . . , s i (t), s j (t)} is public history. An appropriate solution concept for a game with imperfect action monitoring is Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE) [6] which is an extension of the idea of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (a refinement of Nash Equilibrium (NE) that eliminates non-credible threats). Definition 1. The strategy profile (π i , π j ) is a PPE if (π i , π j ) are public strategies and for each time slot t and history h t , (π i , π j ) yields a NE from that time on.
A strategy π = {π t } t=∞ t=0 is called public if for every t, π t depends only on public history h t c and not on agent's private information (in this case the actions of the agents). If a strategy depends only on current history (state) (i.e. a i (t) = π t i (s i (t), s j (t)), a j (t) = π t j (s j (t), s i (t)) for all t) and not on the previous public history up to t, then it is called Markovian public strategy. If additionally it does not depend on t, then it is called Markovian stationary public strategy. We note that if an agent employs π H over all time slots, it constitutes a Markovian stationary public strategy. Henceforth we drop subscripts i, j, t whenever it is clear from the context. Theorem 1. Suppose P a , p, φ > 0 and q >= max {p, φ}. Suppose further that p > φ. Then the honest strategy profile (π H , π H ) is PPE if and only if the following hold for both agents
,
Furthermore, if p ≤ φ, (π H , π H ) is PPE if and only if the following hold for both agents
Proof. If the honest policy π H constitutes the optimal strategy for both agents at every instant and state (s i , s j ), then the Bellman Equation (BE) [7] for i,
must be satisfied for a i = π H (s i , s j ), given that a j = π H (s j , s i ). Then the corresponding value function V H i (s i , s j ) for agent i when both agents follow π H is
where k 4 = 1 − δ + 2δP a φ − δP a φ 2 . The strategy profile (π H , π H ) is a PPE if and only if the one shot deviation principle (OSDP) holds, namely no profitable one shot deviations exist, for every possible public history. OSDP states that if there is a better strategy than the one under consideration, then it is profitable to deviate once and then use the considered strategy for the rest of the game [6] . The only relevant part of public history is the vector of binary trust values (s i , s j ) giving rise to four possibilities. Thus optimality in BE for agent i gives
where 
Next we consider the remaining deviations from π H at the remaining states. Proceeding along similar lines, deviations from π H at (0, 1) by selecting a = 0, a = −1 lead to
respectively. Deviations from π H at (1, 0) by selecting a = 1, a = −1 lead to
respectively. Deviations from π H at (1, 1) by selecting a = 0, a = −1 lead to
respectively, where
For given δ, P a , p, q, φ, e, the right hand side of each inequality (22)-(29) defines a line. Let these lines be denoted as b 1 (c)-b 8 (c), respectively and let λ 1 -λ 8 be the respective slopes. It is
If λ (24) and (25) hold, then (27) holds. Finally,
Since
(1 − P a )e and it is
which holds. Thus, if p > φ (resp. p ≤ φ) then (23), (24) and (25) (resp. (24) and (25)) suffice to represent the region over which the honest policy π H prevails and the rest of inequalities are redundant. The proof is complete.
Next, we consider the behavior of the set defined by (14) if p > φ and (15) if p ≤ φ as the illegal gain e varies. This set describes the structural properties of reward-related parameters f, c, e that are consistent with the optimality of the honest policy π H for given values of δ, P a , p, φ, q (see Fig. 1 ).
Proof.
The slopes λ 2 =−k 2 , λ 3 =k 3 , λ 4 =0 are independent of e. The offsets of b 2 (c), b 4 (i.e. k 1 (1−P a )e, k 3 (1−P a )e, respectively) are both increasing in e, as the coefficients of e are always positive for 0 < δ < 1, 0 < P a , p, φ, while the offset of
and according to (32), it is c A < c B .
On the other hand, if p ≤ φ, then K(e) is defined only by b 3 (c), b 4 , according to Theorem 1. Let Z = (c Z , f Z ) be the intersection of b 4 with the line c = 0. The points defining K(e) are Z, B. For e > e the points defining K(e ) are B and Z = (c Z , f Z ), with c Z = c Z = 0 and f Z > f Z , because the coefficient of e (i.e. k 3 (1 − P a )) is positive. Proposition 1 states that as the illegal gain increases, attacking becomes more tempting and thus the region where π H constitutes the optimal strategy becomes smaller.
IV. DISCUSSION
Theorem 1 states that if it is not profitable for an agent to deviate from π H and select a = −1 when being at states (0, 0), (0, 1) (see (23), (25)) and a = 0 at state (0, 1) (see (24)), then there will be no profitable deviations from π H at other states, as well, given that the other agent follows π H .
Assuming only selfish agents that can not take the malicious action, K(e) is actually independent of e and it is defined only by (24) (given that the punishment rate q is at least as big as the redemption rate p). This means that if a selfish agent has enough incentives at state (0, 1) to follow π H (0, 1) = 1 and pay the transmission cost c to transit to (1, 1) with probability P a p in order to receive forwarding benefits f , then it will be beneficial to follow π H at every other state.
Malicious behavior changes the above conditions. Eq. (25) is analogous to (24) and ensures that deviations a = −1 at state (0, 1) are not profitable. Eq. (23) ensures that a = −1 at (0, 0) is not profitable. This is needed because malicious behavior could have benefits by this deviation as it could result in a positive instantaneous reward as opposed to the selfish case where the myopic optimal choice coincides with π H (0, 0) = 0. Thus, there is need to provide agents with incentives not to opt to a = −1 at state (0, 0). This is the purpose of the redemption rate φ. For instance, if φ = 0, then (0, 0) is an absorbing state and a = −1 (resp. a = 0) is the optimal choice if (1−P a )e > c (resp. (1 − P a )e ≤ c).
The individual impact of the remaining parameters on the honest optimality region K(e) can be assessed by differentiating the respective lines on the boundary. Suppose p ≤ φ ≤ q. Then analysis of the partial derivatives of b 3 (c) and b 4 with respect to P a and p shows that the set K(e) gets larger as P a , p increase. This confirms intuition because for higher values of the IDS sampling probability P a , misbehaving will be detected and punished with higher probability. Moreover, for higher values of the redemption rate p the incentives to comply with the honest policy become larger and misbehaving becomes less tempting.
The impact of the sampling probability P a and redemption rate p on the honest optimality region can be studied in a similar manner. Suppose p ≤ φ ≤ q. We express (24) and (25) in terms of P a and p for given δ, φ, q and for a given set of payoff parameters, assuming f > c, e. The research region has smooth boundaries that form conic sections. Differentiation shows that p is decreasing in P a . Thus for higher values of IDS sampling probability P a , smaller values of the redemption rate p suffice to sustain optimality for π H . This confirms intuition because for higher values of P a , compliance with π H is more likely to be detected and thus the agent to be forgiven and transit to s = 1. Moreover, for higher values of P a attacking is more likely to be detected.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper the impact of action monitoring and trust update mechanisms on the decision making process of autonomous agents able to exhibit both selfish and malicious behavior was investigated. Conditions leading the agents to follow a desired trust-based strategy were derived when the agents condition their actions to the publicly observed trust values. Such conditions can be utilized to jointly design costeffective IDS and TMS mechanisms for detecting misbehaving patterns and incentivizing agents to follow a desired behavior to enhance network security and other performance measures.
